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I
n this paper, we study the feasibility of efficient contracting in dynamic environments. For concreteness, we cast the analysis in the context of a (finitely or infinitely) repeated bilateral trade problem, such as the one faced by the supplier and the buyer of a service, which can be provided in multiple periods. A natural benchmark for such problems is given by the impossibility theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) : In a one-shot interaction with two-sided private information, there do not exist satisfactory trading mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that achieve efficient trade while being incentive compatible, individually rational, and budget balanced. We characterize informational conditions under which this negative result is overturned when the agents can trade more than once.
A dynamic setting brings about two novel features. First, the agents' privately known values may change over time, with the resulting process exhibiting some form of serial dependence. Second, the agents may have private information about this process beyond just knowing their values for the current transaction. For instance, the seller of a service may have superior information not only about his current cost, but also about his long-run average cost, or about the likelihood of shocks to his cost structure. In order to accommodate such multidimensional asymmetric information, we model the agents' values as evolving over time according to a pair of Markov processes, the parameters of which may be part of the agents' initial private information along with the starting values of the processes.
We start by showing that satisfactory mechanisms exist if and only if the expected present value of (first-best) gains from trade is no higher than the sum of worst-case expectations of gains from trade from the perspective of each agent. Specifically, an agent's worst-case expectation is computed as the infimum of the expected present value of gains from trade conditional on the agent's initial information, where the infimum is over both the starting value and the parameters of his Markov process. Thus, the condition imposes a restriction on the sensitivity of expected gains from trade to the agents' initial information, implying that efficient dynamic contracting requires sufficient congruence of the agents' private expectations. 1 The above characterization provides a precise, yet simple, answer to the question: How does the feasibility of efficient dynamic contracting depend on the features of the bargaining environment? Namely, anything that makes an agent's worst-case conditional expectation of gains from trade more similar to the unconditional expectation is (weakly) good news for efficiency. Conversely, any change that leads to the unconditional and conditional expectations being more different makes efficiency harder to achieve. For example, extending the duration of the relationship is beneficial only to the extent that the agents have less information about their future values (say, because of shocks to their costs) and that they are sufficiently patient for this to be reflected in the expected present value calculation.
We illustrate how this result can be put to work beyond general level intuitions by considering three applications.
First, for processes with positive serial correlation in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, we show that the condition for efficiency is harder to satisfyand hence satisfactory mechanisms are less likely to exist-the more persistent the process. This formalizes the intuition that persistence is detrimental to efficiency as persistent information is difficult to elicit due to it affecting payoffs in many periods.
Second, if the agents have private information about the parameters of their type of processes, we show that satisfactory mechanisms may exist despite this information being fully persistent provided that the range of possible processes is "not too large." We also discuss which features of the distributions of the parameters are relevant for the conclusion. Moreover, we show that given enough uncertainty over possible processes, satisfactory mechanisms may fail to exist even if the agents are arbitrarily patient and values are purely transitory.
Third, we distinguish between increasing patience and more frequent interaction, and show that if values are auto-correlated, the latter need not facilitate efficiency even if the former does. This is because an increase in the trading frequency has two effects: it leads to a smaller per period discount factor, but implies higher correlation of values in adjacent periods as there is less time for values to evolve between trades. The first effect is simply an increase in patience, which makes unconditional and conditional expectations of gains from trade more similar, whereas the second amounts to an increase in persistence, which goes in the opposite direction. As a result, the continuous-time limit may exhibit inefficiency even if efficiency can be achieved in the same model by sending the discount rate to zero. This gives an adverse-selection analog of the result of Abreu, Milgrom, and Pearce (1991) , who point out the difference of the two limits for two-sided moral hazard.
For completeness, we also discuss second-best analysis, and illustrate that the dynamics of distortions may be qualitatively different depending on whether the agents' initial information is about their initial value and cost, or about a process parameter. 2 As we explain in the last section, our characterization and its consequences readily extend to general dynamic Bayesian collective choice problems such as double auctions, public good provision, or allocation of resources within a team. The extension presented there provides a dynamic generalization of the characterization for static private value environments by Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) , Williams (1999) , and Krishna and Perry (2000) . In terms of the model, this paper is most closely related to the work of Athey and Miller (2007) and Segal (2007, 2013) . Athey and Miller study repeated bilateral trade when types are independent and identically distributed across periods, thus abstracting from the two features central to our analysis. Athey and Segal (2013) establish a general "folk theorem" for Markov games with transfers, which implies that in a discrete-type version of our problem, if the horizon is infinite, initial information is only about starting values, and processes are ergodic, then satisfactory mechanisms exist given sufficiently little discounting. Athey and Segal (2007) specialize this result to two examples of bilateral trade. In contrast, our characterization allows us to compute the critical discount factor, establish comparative statics (e.g., with respect to persistence and trading frequency), and study the case where initial private information is about process parameters, which is ruled out by their ergodicity assumption.
In terms of the methods, we draw on recent advances in dynamic mechanism design, which in turn build on earlier contributions by Baron and Besanko (1984) , Courty and Li (2000) , Battaglini (2005) , and Eső and Szentes (2007) among others. In particular, our analysis applies to environments that satisfy a dynamic version of the payoff-equivalence property familiar from static quasilinear environments. We provide sufficient conditions for it to hold in the Appendix where we establish a payoff-equivalence theorem for environments with multidimensional initial information by extending the necessary condition for incentive compatibility by Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014-henceforth PST) to our setting. Our discussion of second best also builds on their results. Athey and Segal (2013) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) construct efficient dynamic mechanisms, which extend VCG mechanisms to dynamic private-value environments. Our results on ex post budget balance rely on Athey and Segal's method of balancing transfers, which yields a dynamic version of the AGV mechanism of d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) .
I. The Environment
Consider the following dynamic bargaining environment with two-sided private information. 4 There are two agents, a buyer ( B ) and a seller ( s ), who may trade a nonstorable good and a numeraire in each of countably many periods indexed by t = 0, 1, … , T , with T ≤ ∞ . (For example, the seller can provide a service for which the buyer pays in cash.) If the period-t allocation of the good is x t ∈ {0, 1} and agent i ∈ {B, s} receives p i, t units of the numeraire, then the resulting flow payoffs are x t v t + p B, t for the buyer and p s, t − x t c t for the seller. The value v t and cost c t are private information of the respective agents, and evolve as described below. The agents evaluate streams of flow payoffs according to the discounted average criterion with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1] with δ < 1 if T = ∞ .
The buyer's values are given by a privately observed stochastic process
k be convex sets. The law of V is given by a mixture of Markov chains defined by an initial distribution F 0 on Ω B ×  0 and a parameterized family
is determined as the realization of the random vector ( Θ B , V 0 ) with distribution F 0 . The buyer's private information in period 0 consists of the vector ( θ B , v 0 ) , and hence, from his perspective V is simply the Markov chain
is only informed of the distribution F 0 and the family {F( · | · ; θ B )} θ B ∈ Ω B , which are assumed common knowledge as usual. Thus, the buyer's payoff-relevant private information in any period t consists of the transitory component v t as well as the permanent component θ B . Analogously, the seller's privately observed cost evolves on the interval  ⊂ ℝ according to a process c = ( c t ) t=0 T generated by the kernels {G( · | · ; θ s )} θ s ∈ Ω s and the joint distribution G 0 of ( Θ s , c 0 ) on Ω s ×  0 for some convex sets Ω s ⊂ ℝ k and  0 ⊂  . From the seller's perspective, c is the Markov chain ⟨ c 0 , G( · | · ; θ s )⟩ determined by his period-0 private information ( θ s , c 0 ) , whereas the buyer only knows the pair ( G 0 , {G( · | · ; θ s )} θ s ∈ Ω s ) . In every period t , the seller's payoff-relevant private information consists of the vector ( θ s , c t ) .
We assume that the processes V and c are independent, which is the dynamic extension of the independent-types assumption familiar from static models. For simplicity, we also assume that the initial distributions F 0 and G 0 have full support on their respective domains. Finally, to ensure that expected allocation utilities are By the revelation principle, in order to characterize incentive compatible outcomes, it is without loss to focus on truthful equilibria of direct revelation mechanisms where in each period the agents simply report their new private information, and the mechanism determines the allocation and transfers as a function of the history of reports. However, in a dynamic setting the set of implementable decision rules in general depends on the degree of transparency in the mechanism. The most permissive results are achieved with the least amount of information disclosure as hiding information from an agent amounts to pooling his incentive constraints (see, e.g., Myerson 1986 ). As will be clear from our results, for the purposes of the current paper this issue can be addressed by considering only the two extreme cases: a fully transparent mechanism, where all reports, allocations, and transfers are public; and the fully opaque mechanism, where reports are confidential and transfers are never observed by either agent. While the latter is best viewed as a purely theoretical construct, it should be noted that real-world trading institutions are typically price-based indirect mechanisms, which entail an intermediate level of transparency. Thus, it is important to look beyond public mechanisms.
Formally, a decision rule is a (measurable) map
, where x is the allocation rule and p is the transfer rule, whose period-t components x t and p t are functions only of the (reported) parameters, values, and costs in periods 0, … , t . 7 A decision rule μ induces a multi-stage game form where in every period t = 0, 1, … , T , given history of reports
t , timing is as follows:
The agents privately observe their own current types v t ∈  and c t ∈  (or
t.3
The decision rule μ determines the allocation x t ∈ {0, 1} and transfers
Note that the agents are restricted to reporting types that are consistent with the supports of the type process. If the agents observe each other's reports at stage t.2 as well as the allocation and transfers at stage t.3 , then this game form is the public mechanism with decision rule μ , or simply the public mechanism μ . In contrast, if each agent observes neither transfers nor the other agent's reports, then the above game form is the blind mechanism with decision rule μ , or the blind mechanism μ for short. In what follows, we use "mechanism μ " as the general term to refer to both the public and the blind mechanism with decision rule μ .
The set of feasible period-t histories of agent i in a mechanism μ is denoted  i, t μ , or simply  i, t , if μ is clear from the context. 8 A strategy for the buyer is then a sequence of (measurable)
T is defined analogously. We say that agent i 's history h i, t ∈  i, t is truthful if his own reports have been truthful in all periods 0, … , t − 1 . We say that strategy σ i for agent i is truthful, denoted σ i * , if it reports truthfully at all truthful histories.
A mechanism μ and a strategy profile σ := ( σ B , σ s ) induce an allocation process X on {0, 1} and a payment process P := ( P B , P s ) on ℝ 2 in the obvious way. For any period t and truthful histories h B, t ∈  B, t and h s, t ∈  s, t , we denote the expected continuation utilities for the buyer and the seller, respectively, by
, and
Our convention is to omit σ if the strategies are truthful ( e.g., u t
The following definitions are standard (see, e.g., Athey and Segal 2013; Bergemann and Välimäki 2010; or PST) :
The mechanism μ is perfect Bayesian incentive compatible (PIC) if it is IC and the game induced by the mechanism has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in truthful strategies. The mechanism is within-period ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) if it is PIC and for all t , all pairs of truthful histories ( h B, t , h s, t ) ∈  B, t ×  s, t , and each agent i , a truthful strategy is a best response for agent i even if he knows the history h j, t of agent j ≠ i .
8 Formally, the sets of buyer's histories in a public mechanism are defined recursively by setting
, in each period, the history is augmented with the previous period reports, allocation, and transfers, and the buyer's new value.) In a blind mechanism these become  B, 0 := Ω B ×  0 ,  B, 1 :=  B, 0 × Ω B ×  0 ×  × {0, 1} , and  B, t :=  B, t−1 ×  ×  × {0, 1} for t ≥ 2 (i.e., in each period, the history is augmented with the buyer's previous period report and allocation as well as his new value.) The sets  s, t for the seller are defined analogously.
An agent can never observe that the other agent has deviated from truthful reporting due to the restriction on reports at stage t.2 , and hence the difference between IC and PIC is essentially just the fact that the former requires sequential rationality only almost surely, whereas the latter imposes it everywhere.
The mechanism μ is individually rational (IR) if for all t , and all truthful histories
Individual rationality in period 0 corresponds to a situation where the agents, having observed their initial private information, decide whether to commit to a long-term contract or to take their outside option, which yields a payoff of zero. For individual rationality we require, in addition, that the agents expected continuation payoffs under truthful reporting remain nonnegative in all future periods.
Ex ante budget balance is the relevant notion in situations where the operation of the mechanism can be financed by a third party. Then it corresponds to the requirement that, in terms of the expected present value, the profit to the third party be nonnegative. In contrast, in a budget balanced mechanism the sum of transfers is identically zero at all possible reporting histories, and hence such a mechanism requires no outside financing.
Remark 1: Fix a decision rule (x, p) . Let μ and η denote the public and the blind mechanism with decision rule (x, p) . Observe that in every period t and for each agent i , the set of histories  i, t η in the blind mechanism η corresponds to a partition of the set of histories  i, t μ in the public mechanism μ . Therefore, if μ has any of the properties listed in Definitions 1-4, then η has the same property, but the converse is clearly not true in general. More generally, fix any mechanism λ with decision rule (x, p) and with an arbitrary information disclosure policy (e.g., λ may involve sending noisy, private signals to the players about the history of the other agent's reports and transfers). The information structure in the blind mechanism η amounts to a coarsening of the agents' information in the mechanism λ , and hence if λ has any of the properties in Definitions 1-4, then η has the same property. (Indeed, this is simply the dynamic revelation principle.) On the other hand, the information structure in the public mechanism μ refines the information in λ , which makes the properties harder to satisfy.
III. A Characterization
We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of mechanisms that are efficient, individually rational, and budget-balanced. The tightness of our condition relies on the following property of the bargaining environment:
The environment has the payoff-equivalence property if for all ic mechanisms μ = (x, p) and
The above notion is a dynamic analog of the familiar static payoff-equivalence (or revenue-equivalence) property, which here obtains as a special case by taking T = 0 . Similarly to static settings, the property is satisfied in sufficiently well-behaved environments. We provide an informal discussion of sufficient conditions for payoff equivalence at the end of this section, and relegate a formal account-including a novel payoff-equivalence theorem for dynamic models with multi-dimensional initial information (Proposition A1)-to the Appendix.
Denote the first-best gains from trade by
where for any a ∈ ℝ , we write a + := max {0, a} . Our main tool for the analysis of repeated bargaining is given by the following result, the proof of which can be found in Appendix A2 (along with all other omitted proofs). 
(ii) There exists a blind mechanism that is E, IC, IR 0 , and BB 0 .
(iii) There exists a public mechanism that is E, PIC, IR 0 , and BB.
(iv) There exists a public mechanism that is E, EPIC, IR, and BB 0 .
Remark 2: If (1) is not satisfied, then for each of the statements (ii)-(iv) in Proposition 1, the minimum (expected) subsidy required for the existence of a mechanism having the listed properties is given by
Proposition 1 shows that inequality (1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a bargaining mechanism that delivers efficient, unsubsidized, and voluntary trade. Note that the properties invoked in statement (ii) are arguably the weakest possible requirements for a satisfactory mechanism as incentive compatibility is imposed without perfection, balancing the budget may rely on an unbounded credit line, the agents are able to commit to a long-term contract, and minimal feedback is provided to the agents as the mechanism is blind-see Remark 1. Thus, there is no scope for relaxing (1).
In the other direction, statements (iii) and (iv) show, respectively, that (1) is in fact sufficient for efficient trade to be perfect Bayesian incentive compatible in a public mechanism that is either budget balanced period by period and individually rational in period 0, or individually rational in every period and budget balanced ex ante. (In the latter case, incentive compatibility can be strengthened to hold within-period ex post.) However, (1) is not sufficient to simultaneously guarantee ex post budget balance and individual rationality in every period. Indeed, as we discuss below, when the horizon is finite, no such mechanism exists, and even with an infinite horizon, a stronger condition is needed.
For the special case of a static model, Proposition 1 follows from the characterizations by Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) ; Williams (1999) ; or Krishna and Perry (2000) .
9 However, in a static model, inequality (1) is satisfied only in the trivial case where there is common knowledge of positive gains from trade, which yields an alternative proof of Myerson and Satterthwaite's (1983) theorem. In contrast, in dynamic settings the existence of future surplus allows (1) to be satisfied in many cases where gains from trade are not certain.
In order to interpret inequality (1), we note that it imposes a joint restriction on the sensitivity of the expected (first-best) gains from trade, E[Y ] , on each agent's initial private information. 10 In our dynamic setting, there are two new channels through which this information matters. First, fixing the parameters θ = ( θ B , θ s ) , V and c are Markov processes, and hence varying v 0 or c 0 will in general vary the distribution of the period-t gains from trade, ( V t − c t ) + , in every period t (rather than just in period 0 ), with the effect being more pronounced the more persistent the process. Second, for fixed initial values ( v 0 , c 0 ) , the distribution of Y may depend on the privately known parameters θ . Inequality (1) imposes a joint lower bound on the most pessimistic period 0 expectations about Y that may be held by each agent. Hence, we interpret Proposition 1 as saying that the agents' expectations have to be sufficiently congruent for bilateral bargaining to be efficient. For example, it immediately follows that repeated interaction (i.e., T > 0 ) is beneficial only if there is less asymmetric information about the future than the present. 9 See also Athey and Miller (2007) for an exploration of different combinations of properties in the case of independent and identically distributed types drawn from known distributions. 10 Trivially, if at most one agent has private information in period 0 (i.e., if Ω B ×  0 or Ω s ×  0 is a singleton), then at least one of the infimum terms equals E [Y ] , implying that the inequality is satisfied. Thus, satisfactory mechanisms exist in this case despite there being bilateral private information in the future. On the other hand, if initial private information is two-sided, and it is possible that one of the agents knows based on his initial information that there are no gains from trade
, then the inequality is never satisfied.
Since the payoff-equivalence property is taken as given, the proof of Proposition 1 parallels that of the static case, with a repeated Groves' scheme and the balancing trick of Athey and Segal (2013) replacing, respectively, the static VCG and AGV mechanisms in the argument. Analogously to the static setting, the proof provides another interpretation of inequality (1): the terms on the left are the utilities of the worst initial types of the buyer and the seller under the repetition of the static Groves' scheme, whereas the term on the right is the expected budget deficit under that scheme. Hence, (1) is the condition under which this simple mechanism could be financed (in expectation) by charging type-independent participation fees in period 0 . If (1) is not satisfied, a mechanism designer wanting to achieve efficient, individually rational, and budget balanced trade (in any mechanism) would need to subsidize it by exactly the shortfall.
As suggested by the above proof sketch, Proposition 1 immediately generalizes to other dynamic bargaining problems. We state one such extension to n -person problems in the concluding remarks (Section VI).
One may wonder about the possibility of satisfying both individual rationality and budget balance period by period. With a finite horizon, no mechanism satisfies E, IC, IR, and BB. This follows by noting that under these conditions, the last period T essentially reduces to a static problem because the budget has to be balanced at the end of period T − 1 .
11 The ability of finite long-term contracts to support efficient trade thus rests on third party financing (BB 0 ) or contract enforcement (IR 0 ). With an infinite horizon, a general characterization appears to be out of reach as it would require tracking the agents' beliefs. However, for public mechanisms, it can be shown by an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 1 that if the kernels have full support, then E, PIC, IR, and BB can be satisfied if and only if inequality (1) holds and
is taken with respect to the type processes with parameters θ , with c 0 drawn from G( · | c −1 ; θ s ) (and similarly for
A. conditions for Payoff Equivalence
We provide here an informal discussion of sufficient conditions for the payoff-equivalence property, relegating a formal treatment to the Appendix. The reader more interested in the implications of Proposition 1 may proceed directly to the next section.
Recall that in static models where each agent's type is a real vector, the payoff-equivalence property can be established as an implication of an appropriately formulated envelope theorem (see Milgrom and Segal 2002) . The regularity assumption required for this approach is that each agent's utility function vary 11 The formal result requires that with positive probability, the period-T type distribution satisfies the assumptions of Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem. For example, this holds if for all (v, c, θ B , θ s ) , the supports of F( · | v; θ B ) and G( · | c; θ s ) are intervals whose intersection has a nonempty interior.
12 Segal (2007, 2013) show that a public mechanism that is E, PIC, IR, and BB exists in a class of ergodic Markov environments with known parameters and finitely many types, if agents are sufficiently patient. We conjecture that the same is true in our model whenever (1) is satisfied for some δ < 1 .
smoothly in the type with a bounded derivative. In a dynamic setting, this translates, roughly, to the requirement that a change in an agent's initial private information have a smooth effect on his expected utility over dynamic allocation and transfer rules. As the expected utility depends on both the (Bernoulli) utility function as well as the stochastic process for the agent's future types, a condition stated on the primitives must require that both the utility function and the stochastic process vary "sufficiently smoothly" in the agent's initial private information. PST provide sufficient conditions for this in a general class of dynamic models where each agent's new private information is one dimensional in every period, and establish an envelope theorem for such problems (PST, Theorem 1).
Our environment is not immediately covered by the result of PST as here the agents' initial information is multidimensional. However, by combining the standard payoff-equivalence argument for static multidimensional models (see, e.g., Holmström 1979) with the dynamic envelope formula of PST, it is possible to establish a payoff-equivalence result for dynamic models with multidimensional initial information. 13 We provide general sufficient conditions for this in the Appendix by introducing the notion of a regular environment (Definition A2) and proving that such environments have the payoff-equivalence property (Proposition A1). These conditions are somewhat cumbersome to state, and hence it is convenient to introduce the following easy-to-check smoothness condition, which is a special case of regular environments (see Lemma A1), and hence (grossly) sufficient for payoff equivalence:
T be a stochastic process on the interval  ⊂ ℝ generated by the kernels {H( · | · ; θ i )} θ i ∈ Ω i and the initial distribution H 0 on the convex set
The process Z is smooth if the following conditions hold:
The environment is smooth if the processes V and c are smooth.
13 Alternatively, one can consider a fictitious environment where the initial period is divided into subperiods and the agents observe and report one dimension of their multidimensional initial type in each subperiod. Any mechanism that is incentive compatible in the original environment remains incentive compatible in the fictitious environment. As private information is one dimensional in the latter, under appropriate regularity conditions one can apply the ex post payoff equivalence result of PST (Theorem 2) to establish a multidimensional payoff equivalence result analogous to our Proposition A1.
The first condition is an assumption of "continuous types." (It also imposes full support and rules out atoms, which is not essential, but simplifies exposition.) The second condition ensures that the process Z is a sufficiently smooth Lipschitz function of the initial information ( z 0 , θ i ) , which is comparable to the differentiability and bounded-derivative assumptions invoked in static models. For example, the conditionally independent and identically distributed types in Example 1 are smooth if F( · | θ B ) and G( · | θ B ) are absolutely continuous given any θ B and θ s , and depend sufficiently regularly on the parameters. Similarly, it can be verified that if the parameters of the linear AR(1) processes of Example 3 are common knowledge, then the processes are smooth simply whenever γ i < 1 _ δ for i ∈ {B, s} . In contrast, the renewal model of Example 2 is clearly not smooth as the transitions have atoms (but it is regular in the sense of Definition A2 by Lemma A2).
IV. Applications
We now use Proposition 1 to explore, for a fixed discount rate, how the feasibility of efficient contracting depends on persistence, private information about the process parameters θ , and the frequency of interaction. To facilitate discussion, we say that satisfactory trading mechanisms exist if statements (ii)-(iv) in Proposition 1 are satisfied. By Proposition 1, this is the case in environments that have the payoff-equivalence property if and only if
+ denotes the first-best gains from trade.
A. Persistence
We say that the environment is with known parameters if the parameter space Ω = Ω B × Ω s is a singleton, in which case we suppress all references to θ in the notation. We restrict attention to such environments in this subsection in order to focus on the persistence of values and costs. It is useful to start by reviewing the independent and identically distributed case.
Example 4 (Independent and Identically Distributed with Known Parameters):
Consider the environment of Example 1 with known parameters. Then V and c are, respectively, independent and identically distributed draws from the known distributions F 0 and G 0 , which we assume to have strictly positive continuous densities everywhere on their domains. This environment is smooth and hence has the payoff-equivalence property by Proposition A1. For simplicity, take T = ∞ and suppose  =  . Then, 14 At the other extreme, when types are perfectly persistent and do not change over time, the analysis reduces to the static case. The Myerson-Satterthwaite (1983) theorem then implies that gains from trade are bounded away from first-best for any level of the discount factor.
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These two examples suggest that persistence of private information is detrimental to efficiency. In order to formalize this intuition, we need a notion of persistence that discriminates between Markov chains according to their short-run behavior as payoffs are discounted (and the horizon may be finite). The following definition provides one such notion in terms of a partial order on ergodic Markov chains.
T be Markov chains on  ⊂ ℝ with kernels H( · | · ) and H ′ ( · | · ) , respectively. We say that Z is (weakly) more persistent than Z ′ if there exists a distribution Φ satisfying the following conditions: (i) Φ is the unique invariant distribution admitted by the kernels H( · | · ) and H ′ ( · | · ) .
(ii) Φ is the initial distribution of the chains Z and Z ′ .
(iii) For all ( z 0 , z) ∈  2 and all t ≥ 1 , the t -step distributions satisfy
Conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that increasing persistence only affects the short-run properties of the Markov chain. Condition (iii) captures the idea that a more persistent chain converges slower to the invariant distribution. For example, if Z is a Markov chain started from its unique invariant distribution Φ , and Z ′ is a sequence of independent and identically distributed draws from Φ , then Z is more persistent than Z ′ according to the above definition. More generally, the family of chains
, is ordered by persistence with Z α more persistent than Z α ′ if and only if α ≥ α ′ . Note that taking Z to be a fully persistent chain yields the renewal model 14 Their notion of ex ante budget balance requires budget to balance in expectation in every period, whereas our definition only considers the expected balance in period 0. However, with independent and identically distributed types the two are equivalent. 15 Formally, this can be shown by applying our Proposition 1 to the renewal model of Example 2 with known parameters and γ i = 1 for i ∈ {B, s} . This environment is regular by Lemma A2, and hence it has the payoff-equivalence property by Proposition A1. (Because of the non-changing types, payoff equivalence can also be established using the standard static argument, see, e.g., Milgrom and Segal 2002.) of Example 2, which thus provides one possible parameterization of persistence spanning from independent and identically distributed to permanent types.
We can now show that the kind of persistence captured by Definition 7 is harmful when the transitions of the type processes are order-preserving in the following sense: (ii) V is more persistent than V ′ , and c is more persistent than c ′ .
Then the first-best gains from trade under ( V ′ , c ′ ) satisfy inequality (1).
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The key to the proof is the observation that for monotone chains with known parameters, inequality (1)
. To see this, note that the lowest possible value for the buyer is not only the worst current type, but also results in the lowest possible distribution of values in every future period in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance because the chain is assumed to be monotone. . Heuristically, this follows because a monotone chain started from an extreme value (e.g., at min  0 ) converges monotonically to the invariant distribution so that increasing persistence means that the distribution remains concentrated around the unfavorable extreme value for longer.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 imply that satisfactory trading mechanisms are less likely to exist when the type processes are more persistent. The following example illustrates. , this implies that inequality (1) is slack, and, hence, the critical discount factor is lower than in the independent and identically distributed case by continuity. By slightly perturbing the latter process we obtain an ergodic process which is more persistent than the independent and identically distributed process in the sense of Definition 7, yet for which the critical discount factor is strictly less than 1 .
hence it has the payoff-equivalence property by Proposition A1. For any γ B and γ s the invariant distributions are simply F 0 and G 0 , and for any ( v 0 , c 0 ) ∈  ×  , the t -step distributions are
Thus, for all (v, c) ∈  ×  , we have
Therefore, increasing γ i for i ∈ {B, s} results in a more persistent type process for agent i in the sense of Definition 7. Furthermore, the processes V and c are clearly stochastically monotone. Hence, inequality (1) is harder to satisfy for higher values of γ i by Proposition 2. For example, if T = ∞ and  =  , then straightforward calculations show that (1) is equivalent to
where ρ i := 1 − γ i is the probability of a renewal for agent i . That is, satisfactory trading mechanisms exist if and only if the geometric average of the agents' renewal probabilities ( ρ B , ρ s ) ∈ [0, 1] 2 is high enough, with the threshold being decreasing in patience. (Note that δ ≥ 1 _ 2 is a necessary condition.) The fact that persistence is substitutable across agents in (2) is a manifestation of the joint restriction on the agents' processes embodied in (1).
When the agents have private information about the process parameters, the above forces are still at play for any given θ ∈ Ω . But since inequality (1) involves taking infima with respect to the parameters, what matters then is "worst-case persistence" rather than the persistence of the realized processes. For example, if the supports of the values and costs coincide, then an impossibility result obtains as soon as the least favorable type may be an absorbing state for one of the agents, thus generalizing the negative finding from the case of perfectly persistent types.
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However, as the kernels can in general depend on θ in complicated ways, obtaining clean predictions requires additional structure. A natural special case arises when θ simply parameterizes the persistence of the agents' processes. We consider this in the next subsection after some general remarks on the effects of private information about process parameters (see Example 7).
B. Private information about Process Parameters
We now turn to the possibility that the agents have at time zero private information about the distribution of their future types beyond the information contained in v 0 and c 0 . This information is captured by the privately known parameters θ i ∈ Ω i , i ∈ {B, s} . By inspection of inequality (1), if we reduce the asymmetry of information by restricting the parameters to some subsets Ω B ′ ⊂ Ω B and Ω s ′ ⊂ Ω s without affecting the expected gains from trade, E[Y ] , then the inequality is easier to satisfy, and, consequently, satisfactory mechanisms are more likely to exist. In other words, efficient trade is harder to achieve when there is more asymmetric information about the type processes. For completeness, we record this observation in the form of a proposition.
DEFINITION 9: Fix a pair (V, c) of type process generated by The proof is immediate and hence omitted. Taken together, Propositions 1 and 3 provide a sense in which private information about process parameters is detrimental to efficiency. Indeed, inequality (1) allows us to compute exactly when this is the case. In some specific examples this can even be done in closed form. Consider the environment of Example 1 with T = ∞ . Specifically, assume that the distributions belong to the following single-parameter families of linear densities on the unit interval:
The case θ i = 1 corresponds to the uniform distribution. Note that f (· | θ B ) and g( · | θ s ) decrease in θ i in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (i.e., the distributions are the strongest when θ i = 0 and the weakest for θ i = 2 ), and all distributions have full support on [0, 1] . Suppose that each Θ i is distributed over
according to a continuous distribution, which is symmetric around 1 (the distributions can be different for the two agents but for simplicity we take θ _ to be the same for both). By symmetry, the unconditional distributions of V t and c t are then uniform on [0, 1] for all t . This implies that increasing θ _ to some θ _ ′ > θ _ induces a surplus-neutral truncation of parameters. It is straightforward to verify that this environment is smooth, and hence Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 apply, implying that efficiency is easier to achieve for higher values of θ _ . In order to find the cutoff, note that the expected gains from trade always equal
. The worst initial type of the buyer corresponds to having v 0 = 0 and θ B = 2 − θ _ , while for the seller it is ( 1, θ _ ) . Direct computation then yields
This leads us to the following corollary: In the independent and identically distributed case with types drawn from the linear family, satisfactory mechanisms exist if and only if θ _ ≥
In particular, if θ _ = 0 , there is no δ < 1 for which this condition is satisfied.
This example illustrates three general points:
• Even though the parameters θ i are fully persistent, if there is not "too much" uncertainty about the processes, satisfactory mechanisms exist. However, this requires the agents be more patient than in the case where the processes are known (which corresponds to θ _ = 1 , and yields δ ≥ 
does not change either, as it depends only on Ω B .
As a second example, we consider an environment where the agents have private information about persistence. 
and
Let V 0 and c 0 be distributed uniformly on [0, 1] independently of Θ B and Θ s , so that conditional on any θ ∈ Ω , the distribution of V t and c t is simply Φ for all t . The parameters Θ i are distributed on Ω i according to some continuous distribution with full support. Lemma A3 in the Appendix shows that this environment is regular, and hence it has the payoff-equivalence property by Proposition A1.
Conditional on any θ ∈ Ω , the processes V and c are stochastically monotone in the sense of Definition 8. Since increasing θ i leads to a more persistent process in the sense of Definition 7, 18 an argument analogous to the proof of Proposition 2 shows that the worst case for each agent corresponds to having θ i = sup Ω i , and the least favorable type in period 0 (i.e., v 0 = 0 or c 0 = 1 ). Moreover, we have
independently of the distribution or the support of Θ i . Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 then imply the following:
• Given any parameter spaces Ω i ⊂ [0, 1] , i ∈ {B, s} , satisfactory mechanisms exist if and only if such mechanisms exist when it is common knowledge that each agent's type process is the most persistent one possible (i.e., that θ i = sup Ω i for i ∈ {B, s} ).
• Any Ω ′ ⊂ Ω induces a surplus-neutral truncation of parameters, which makes inequality (1) easier to satisfy (strictly so, if sup Ω i ′ < sup Ω i for some i ∈ {B, s} ).
C. Trading Frequency
Let T = ∞ throughout this subsection, and denote by Δ > 0 (real) time between periods. A natural modeling strategy that allows varying Δ is to fix an underlying pair of independent continuous-time processes, and think of the discrete-time processes V and c generated by sampling the continuous-time processes at Δ intervals. This implies that increasing frequency of interaction by reducing Δ has two realistic effects: It reduces discounting between interactions and increases correlation between agent's types in adjacent periods. Based on our remarks on persistence, the former tends to be favorable for efficient bargaining whereas the latter tends to be detrimental. Depending on the parameters, either may dominate.
Example 8: Consider the renewal model with known parameters considered in Example 5. Suppose that the type renewals of agent i are generated by Poisson arrivals at rate λ i for i ∈ {B, s} . Then ρ i = 1 − e − λ i Δ , which implies that in the continuous-time limit (i.e., as Δ → 0 ), the necessary and sufficient condition (2) derived in Example 5 simplifies further to
where r is the continuous-time discount rate. That is, frequent interaction facilitates efficient, budget-balanced, and unsubsidized trade if and only if the geometric average of the renewal rates is higher than the discount rate.
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Note that, in contrast, taking δ = e −rΔ → 1 by sending r → 0 always leads to inequality (2) being satisfied provided that neither agent has a fully persistent type (i.e., that ρ i > 0 , or equivalently, that λ i > 0 for both i ). Hence, the two limits lead to qualitatively different results if we start from a situation with 0 < √ ____ λ B λ s < r . This suggests that the efficiency results for high δ in repeated adverse selection models in the literature (e.g., in Athey and Miller 2007; Athey and Segal 2013; Escobar and Toikka 2013; or Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin 1994) should be interpreted literally as low discounting results, and the findings will in general be different for the frequent-interaction case. Indeed, the contrast is particularly stark in case of stationary Gaussian types (see Proposition 6 below), but obtaining this result requires second-best analysis, which we turn to next.
V. On Second Best
So far we have restricted attention to studying whether there exists an incentive compatible mechanism with the efficient, or first-best, allocation rule, and which satisfies some form of individual rationality and budget balance. When the necessary and sufficient condition (1) for this fails, it is natural to look for a second-best mechanism, which we take to mean a mechanism that maximizes the expected gains from trade subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance.
Unfortunately, the second-best problem appears highly intractable for the general model. First of all, optimal mechanism design is notoriously difficult with multidimensional types even in a static setting. Hence, we are led to consider environments where new private information is one-dimensional in each period. However, even with this restriction, the existing methods for characterizing optimal dynamic mechanisms require introducing additional structure (see PST, as well as Battaglini and Lamba 2012) . Given that a second-best result as general as Proposition 1 is thus out 19 More precisely, it is straightforward to verify that reducing Δ always helps in the sense of making inequality (2) easier to satisfy, but the inequality is satisfied in the limit if and only if √ ___ λ B λ s ≥ r . We conjecture that this "comparative static" with respect to Δ extends to the generalized renewal processes considered in Example 7.
of reach, we focus here on two special cases, which allow us to illustrate the arguments employed in the second-best analysis, and deliver clean results.
A. Limits of second Best under stationary Gaussian Types
Consider the linear AR(1) processes of Example 3 with known parameters. Assume right away that the horizon is infinite, and that the processes are generated by sampling independent Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes V ̃ and c ̃ defined by the stochastic differential equations are thus defined by a collection {r, Δ, ( α i , σ i , m i ) i∈{B, s} } , where r > 0 , Δ > 0 , α i > 0 , σ i > 0 , and m i ∈ ℝ (for i ∈ {B, s} ). Such processes are smooth, and, hence, Proposition 1 can be applied to obtain the following striking result, which is the starting point for our second-best analysis.
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PROPOSITION 4: if μ is an E, ic, ir 0 mechanism in an environment with stationary Gaussian types, then μ does not satisfy BB 0 . in particular,
That is, efficient, individually rational trade requires a subsidy equal to the expected first-best gains from trade for any choice of the mean reversion and discount rates, the long-run means, or the length of the period! We relegate the proof into the Appendix along all other proofs omitted from this section, but the argument is simple: By Propo sition 1 and Remark 2, it suffices to establish that inf
This in turn follows from the unbounded supports. Namely, given any {r, Δ, ( α i , σ i , m i ) i∈{B, s} } and ε > 0 , we may choose v 0 small enough and c 0 large 20 The result extends a priori to the case where some or all of the parameters ( α i , σ i , m i ) are private information. enough so that conditional on v 0 or c 0 , convergence to the invariant distribution takes arbitrarily long, which results in the expected gains from trade being less than ε despite the fact that α i and m B − m s may be large and r may be small.
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As the first step toward second-best mechanisms, we extend a part of the characterization of static IC, IR, and BB trading mechanisms by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) .
LEMMA 1: consider an environment with stationary Gaussian types. if μ is an IC, IR 0 , and BB 0 mechanism, then
The left-hand side of (3) is the expected dynamic virtual surplus, which is shown to be nonnegative by an argument exactly analogous to the static case. Note that the result only invokes the weakest versions of the three conditions. By Lemma 1, the expected gains from trade in any IC, IR 0 , and BB 0 mechanism are bounded from above by
where both the objective function and the constraint depend on μ only through the allocation rule. We say that μ is a second-best mechanism if μ is IC, IR 0 , and BB 0 , and the gains from trade under μ achieve y * * , which we refer to correspondingly as the expected second-best gains from trade. Next, we show that such mechanisms exist, and that we can ask them to satisfy stronger conditions at no cost.
PROPOSITION 5: The following hold in every environment with stationary Gaussian types:
(i) There exist a public second-best mechanism that is PIC, IR 0 , and BB.
(ii) There exist a public second-best mechanism that is EPIC, IR, and BB 0 .
Furthermore, the allocation rule in any second-best mechanism is almost surely given by the allocation rule x * * defined by setting (for all t ) x t * * = 1 if and only if
where λ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (3) in the optimization problem (4).
To sketch the proof, we observe first that the supremum in (4) is achieved by some mechanism μ since both the expected gains from trade and the expected dynamic virtual surplus are continuous in the allocation rule, and the set of allocation rules is compact. As both the objective function and the constraint in (4) are linear, the allocation rule in the mechanism μ must almost surely be equal to the allocation rule x * * defined in Proposition 5 for some Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 , which is strictly positive by Proposition 4. Note that x * * is "strongly monotone" as for all s ≤ t , increasing v s or decreasing c s weakly increases x t * * . Since the processes are stochastically monotone, Corollary 1 of PST implies that there exists a transfer rule p * * such that the public mechanism μ * * := ( x * * , p * * ) is PIC. The other properties are established using arguments resembling the proofs of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
Analogously to the static case, trade occurs in a second-best mechanism only if the buyer's value exceeds the seller's cost by a sufficient margin, which in the current setting depends on the agents' (reported) first-period types. Recalling that γ i = e − α i Δ < 1 , we see by inspection of (5) that this margin converges to zero as t → 0 , and, hence, distortions vanish over time. As we discuss further in the next subsection, this result is best viewed as a consequence of the fact that the impulse response of each agents' AR(1) process, which is given by γ i t , decays over time. Inequality (5) features the Lagrange multiplier λ , and, hence, it is not immediately obvious how y * * varies in relation to E [Y] as we vary the parameters. However, it is possible to use approximation arguments to show that the findings for the limits r → 0 and Δ → 0 are qualitatively different. In order to state the result, let
, where the second equality follows because initial types are drawn from the stationary distribution.
PROPOSITION 6: Let y * * (r, Δ) denote the expected second-best gains from trade in an environment with stationary Gaussian types given discount rate r > 0 and period length Δ > 0 . Then,
(ii) for all r > 0 , lim Δ→0 y * * (r, Δ) < y * .
The first part gives a limit efficiency result for patient agents, which is somewhat surprising given the negative result of Proposition 4. The reason for the seeming discrepancy is that the large information rents under the first-best rule are in part due to the types far in the tails of the distributions, which contribute little to the expected gains from trade. In particular, a mechanism where trade breaks down permanently given a very low value of v 0 or a very high value of c 0 , but where trading is efficient otherwise, results in a small loss in surplus but yields a large reduction in information rents. As r → 0 , we may move the truncations arbitrarily far out in the tails to obtain an approximately efficient mechanism.
In contrast, for the frequent-interaction limit Δ → 0 , the discount rate r is held constant, and, hence, the lack of uniform bounds on the convergence of the t -step distributions F (t) ( · | v 0 ) across v 0 yields the inefficiency result in the second part of Proposition 6. While the formal arguments differ, the intuition for the finding is similar to that for Proposition 4.
B. second Best with Private Parameters
As a second example, we consider a setting where the initial private information is about a parameter of the type process. Specifically, suppose that V and c are the linear AR(1) processes of Example 3 as above, but now the long-run means m B and m s are private information, i.e., θ B = m B and θ s = m s . To keep initial private information one-dimensional, we assume that v 0 and c 0 are known (i.e.,  0 and  0 are singletons). It is straightforward to verify that this environment is smooth.
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Lemma 1 immediately extends to the current setting with inequality (3) replaced by
The proof is the same and, hence, omitted. 24 Second-best mechanisms are then defined analogously to the previous subsection by substituting inequality (6) for constraint (3) in the second-best problem (4).
There are two differences in the expected dynamic virtual surpluses (3) and (6). The first is due to the hazard rates, which simply reflect what is assumed to be private information in period 0 . The second difference is due to the impulse responses of the type processes to changes in the agents' initial information. For the linear AR(1) processes they can be derived simply by writing out the moving-average representation of the process. For example, for the buyer we have
Thus, when m B is common knowledge, as in the previous subsection, we have the impulse response ∂ v 0 v t = γ B t , which decays over time. In contrast, when m B is private information (and v 0 is known), the impulse response becomes ∂ m B v t = 1 − γ B t , which is increasing over time whenever γ B > 0 . Note that γ B = 0 23 It is even easier to verify regularity in the sense of Definition A.2:
Then ∂ v ψ = γ B and ∇ θ B ψ = 1 − γ B , which are bounded in the desired sense. 24 The only difference is in the expressions for the derivatives. For example, formula (A4) now becomes
where we have omitted conditioning on the known constant v 0 .
corresponds to values being drawn independent and identically distributed from a distribution with a privately known mean-a special case of Example 1-in which case the impulse response is constant over time.
We refer the reader to PST for the general definition and discussion of impulse responses, and their role in optimal mechanism design. For our purposes, the relevant observation is that the dynamics of the impulse responses translate to dynamics of distortions in the second-best mechanisms: PROPOSITION 7: consider the above environment with Gaussian linear Ar (1) processes, where the long-run means are private information, and the sets  0 and
There exist a public second-best mechanism that is Pic, ir 0 , and BB.
(ii) There exist a public second-best mechanism that is EPic, ir, and BB 0 .
Furthermore, the allocation rule in any second-best mechanism is almost surely given by the allocation rule x * * * defined by setting ( for all t ) x t * * * = 1 if and only if
where λ ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on inequality (6) in the second-best problem.
The proof is essentially the same as for Proposition 5, the only subtlety rising from having to establish implementability of an inefficient allocation rule in a non-Markov environment.
By inspection, whenever inequality (1) is not satisfied so that the second-best mechanism differs from the first best, the buyer's value has to exceed the seller's cost by some margin for trade to take place. In period 0, trade is actually efficient given the commonly known values v 0 and c 0 . Thereafter, the margin stays constant in the case of conditionally independent and identically distributed types, but increases over time whenever types are autocorrelated. In contrast, by Proposition 4, distortions decrease over time when the private information is about v 0 and c 0 . Heuristically, the difference is due to the fact that distortions are introduced to screen the agents based on their initial information. Hence, it is efficient to distort more in periods where types are more sensitive to changes in the agents' initial information, the relevant sense of stochastic dependence being captured by the impulse responses-see PST for further discussion.
The above findings about distortions with privately known means mirror the results by Boleslavsky and Said (2013) who study monopolistic screening of an agent who is privately informed about a parameter of his value process. Exploring the properties of optimal dynamic mechanisms when agents have private information about the parameters of their type processes appears to be an interesting direction for future research.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We explore the feasibility of efficient dynamic contracting by deriving, interpreting, and applying a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of efficient, unsubsidized, and individually rational contracts in a setting where agents may have private information about the evolution of their personal uncertainty. The condition is given by inequality (1), which corresponds to an upper bound on the sensitivity of the expected gains from trade to the agents' initial private information. As illustrated in Section IV, the effects of considerations such as persistence, patience, number and frequency of interactions, or asymmetric information about process parameters on the prospects of efficient contracting can be either simply read off of, or computed from, inequality (1). The result relies on a dynamic payoff-equivalence theorem for settings with multidimensional initial information, which may be useful elsewhere.
Our methods apply as such to general dynamic Bayesian collective choice problems in quasi-linear environments. To illustrate this, consider the following class of n -agent problems: In each period t = 0, 1, … , T , with T ∈ ℕ ∪ {∞} , a decision is chosen from a measurable space  . If the decision in period t is x t ∈  and agent i ∈ i := {1, … , n} receives p i, t units of the numeraire, then the resulting flow payoff to agent i is u i ( x t , z i, t ) + p i, t for some (measurable) u i :  ×  i → ℝ . The type z i, t is private information of agent i and evolves on the interval  i ⊂ ℝ according to a parameterized Markov process Z i generated by ( H i, 0 , {H ( · | · ; θ i } θ i ∈ Ω i ) , which is thus of the same form as the value and cost processes V and c in the bilateral trade problem. The agents evaluate streams of flow payoffs according to their discounted average using a common discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] with δ < 1 if T = ∞ .
We normalize the outside option of each agent to zero, and assume that there exists a decision x′ ∈  such that u i (x′, z i ) = 0 for all i ∈ i , all z i ∈  i . Applications fitting this framework include repeated versions of allocation problems such as double auctions, sharing a common resource within a team, and the provision of excludable public goods.
Direct mechanisms and their properties are defined for the above dynamic collective choice problems as in Section II, and the payoff-equivalence property can be defined analogously to Definition 5. Our proof of payoff equivalence (Proposition A1) extends verbatim to show that a sufficient condition for the latter is that (1) the type processes are smooth in the sense of Definition 6 (or, more generally, regular as in Definition A2), and (2) for each agent i ∈ i and every decision x ∈  , u i (x, · ) is differentiable and the family { u i (x, · )} x∈ is equi-Lipschitz.
Denote the first-best social surplus by
where χ * is a static first-best allocation rule. 25 We then have the following generalization of Proposition 1, which provides a dynamic version of the characterization by Makowski and Mezzetti (1994) . (i) The first-best social surplus, s , satisfies
Proposition 1′ permits an analysis analogous to Section IV for any problem in the above class. For example, it allows exploring how the performance of markets organized as double auctions is affected by trading frequency, persistence of valuations, or asymmetric information about the processes generating the valuations.
Another application of Proposition 1′ comes from repeated Bayesian games. Namely, while the above collective choice problems assume transferable utility, inequality (7) obviously remains a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium that maximizes the sum of the players' payoffs even if utility is nontransferable. This observation can be used, for example, to put bounds on firms' ability to collude when their cost structures are private information, thus providing a way of extending the results of Miller (2012) , who shows for the case of independent and identically distributed costs that first-best collusion (or E) is unattainable under ex post incentives and ex post budget balance (or EPIC and BB).
Remark 3: Proposition 1′ is by no means the most general possible statement. Indeed, we assume payoffs to be additively separable across time and evolution of types to be independent of decisions for the ease of exposition, and because for such environments our proof of payoff equivalence goes through verbatim. But since payoff equivalence is simply an assumption for the result, Proposition 1′ immediately extends-with first-best social surplus s appropriately defined-to the general environments studied by Athey and Segal (2013) and Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) as we may take their efficient dynamic mechanisms as the starting point in 25 I.e., χ * ( z 1 , … , z n ) ∈ arg max x∈X ∑ i=1 n u i (x, z i ) for all type profiles ( z 1 , … , z n ) ∈  1 × ⋯ ×  n . 26 Define the mechanism μ = ( x * , p) in the beginning of the proof of Proposition 1 to consist of the repetition of the static Groves' scheme p i, t = ∑ j≠i u j ( x t * , z i, t ) . Then μ is E, EPIC, and IR with budget deficit equal to (n − 1)E[s] . The rest of the proof now goes through with the obvious adjustments. the proof. Sufficient conditions for the payoff-equivalence property to hold can then be obtained as in this paper by applying or extending the results of PST.
Finally, we have abstracted from institutional detail throughout the paper in order to focus on the informational problems inherent in dynamic contracting. A natural question for future research is to investigate to what extent the results are affected by the introduction of additional concerns. For example, as noted above, inequality (1) is in general not enough to simultaneously guarantee ex post budget balance and individual rationality in every period. Hence, while (1) remains a necessary condition for any environment, it need not be sufficient in some institutional settings. 
if T is finite, it suffices that the constant b be finite.
The environment is regular if the processes V and c are regular.
An easy-to-check sufficient condition for regularity is provided by the notion of smoothness introduced in Definition 6 in the main text.
LEMMA A1: Every smooth environment is regular.
PROOF:
It suffices to show that a smooth process is a regular process. We do this by showing that the canonical representation of a smooth process satisfies the conditions of Definition A2. 
where the right-hand side is bounded by some b < ) satisfies the second condition in Definition A2. Similarly, we have 
Note that the assumed differentiability of the inverses is satisfied, e.g., if the environment is with known parameters, or if F 0 ( · | θ B ) and G 0 ( · | θ s ) have strictly positive densities given any θ ∈ Ω , and the ratios
are bounded uniformly in (θ, v, c) ∈ Ω ×  ×  .
Consider the buyer's process V . Define the state representation (, Q, ψ) as follows: Put  = [0, 1] × {0, 1} , and let Q = Q 1 × Q 2 , where Q 1 is the uniform distribution on [0, 1] , and the distribution Q 2 on {0, 1} is defined by Pr { ε 2 = 1} = γ B . Define ψ by setting
Verifying that this indeed defines a state representation is straightforward. Moreover, ψ( θ B , v, ε) is clearly a differentiable function of ( θ B , v) , and we have
Therefore, the buyer's process V is regular. The seller's process c is treated similarly.
We may now establish our payoff-equivalence result.
PROPOSITION A1: Every regular environment has the payoff-equivalence property.
In the special case where each agent's initial private information is one dimensional, Proposition A1 follows from the results of PST. The extension to the multidimensional case presented here is novel. The proof, which combines the standard payoff-equivalence argument from static multidimensional models can be sketched as follows: Fix an IC mechanism, and let α be a smooth path (e.g., a line segment) between two initial types of the buyer, say,
. Consider an auxiliary problem where a buyer, whose true initial type is in α , is restricted to report a type in α in period 0 (but may report any v t in periods t > 0 ). In this problem, the agent's initial type is one-dimensional. Since the mechanism is IC, a truthful strategy is still optimal for the buyer and results in the same payoff as in the original model. Furthermore, if the environment is regular, then this auxiliary problem satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1 of PST. This implies that the payoff difference between any two types in α is pinned down by the allocation rule alone. As ( v 0 0 , θ B 0 ) and ( v 0 1 , θ B 1 ) were arbitrary, the result follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION A1:
Fix some IC mechanism μ = (x, p) , and two initial buyer types
) . (The seller is treated analogously.) The proposition is proven by establishing that the equilibrium-payoff difference u
) depends only on the allocation rule x if V is regular.
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27 To see this, fix an arbitrary a ∈ Ω B ×  0 . Given any IC mechanisms μ , η with the same allocation rule x ,
Fix a smooth path α : 
where the second equality follows since the optimal truthful report remains feasible. By inspection of the second line, we can view W as the value function to a family of dynamic optimization problems parameterized by the initial type λ ∈ [0, 1] , where in period 0 the buyer with true initial type λ is restricted to report some initial type λ ′ ∈ [0, 1] and makes a report v ̂ t ∈  in periods t > 0 , as usual. As the initial type λ is one-dimensional, this auxiliary problem is amenable to the first-order approach of PST. In particular, their Theorem 1 implies that under certain conditions, W is Lipschitz-continuous with a derivative W ′ independent of p , so the independence of u
follows from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus by observing that
Thus, to complete the proof, it suffices to verify that if the process V is regular, then the auxiliary problem satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1 of PST. The buyer's type in the auxiliary problem is given by a sequence (λ, v 1 , v 2 , … , v T ) , and his payoff takes the time-separable form
Thus, the utility function is clearly differentiable and equi-Lipschitz continuous in types in the sense of PST's conditions U-D and U-ELC (see PST, section 2.1). Similarly, condition F-BE, which requires the expected discounted type to be finite conditional on any history, follows immediately from our assumption that
It remains to show that the type process in the auxiliary problem has "bounded impulse responses" and thus satisfies condition F-BIR. Since we will apply the envelope formula only in the initial period, it suffices to verify this for period 0 (i.e., that PST's condition F-BIR holds for s = 0 ). Given initial type λ , future types are distributed as follows:
Finally, we show that the environment in Example 7 is regular and hence has the payoff-equivalence property.
LEMMA A3: The environment in Example 7 is regular.
PROOF:
By symmetry, it suffices to consider the buyer's process V . By the properties of the twice-reflected Brownian motion (see, e.g., Harrison 1985) , the kernel _ F ( v ′ | v) is a differentiable function of (v′, v) with a density _ f (v′ | v) bounded away from zero uniformly in (v′, v) and with a uniformly bounded partial derivative ∂ v _ F . Therefore, there exists ε > 0 and K < ∞ , such that for all (v′, v, θ B 
Similarly, we have
Thus, the process V is smooth, save for the constant 
B. omitted Proofs

PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
The implication (iii) ∨ (iv) ⇒ (ii) follows immediately from Definitions 1-4 (see Remark 1). Hence, it suffices to show (i) ⇒ (iii) ∧ (iv) , and (ii) ⇒ (i) .
We establish (i) ⇒ (iv) by showing that if (1) holds, there is a simple mechanism that has the desired properties. Consider first the public mechanism μ = ( x * , p) , which consists of running a static Groves' scheme in every period; i.e., the allocation rule x * and the payment rule p are defined by setting, for all t ,
29 By construction, μ is E, and each player's payoff equals the first-best gains from trade ( V t − c t ) + in each period t . Thus, μ is IR, and period-0 payoffs are given by u 0
Furthermore, in each period t , the agents' reports only affect the current allocation and transfers, and thus μ is EPIC by the usual static argument. Finally, note that μ runs an expected budget deficit equal to the expected gains from trade, or
. 29 In our environment, this mechanism coincides with the team mechanism of Athey and Segal (2013) and the Dynamic Pivot mechanism of Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) .
Consider the first inequality. The distributions of V 0 and V 0 ′ agree by Definition 7 so that by compactness there exists w := min  0 = min  0 ′ . Note that the degenerate distribution at w , denoted μ w , is (first-order stochastically) dominated by every other distribution on  0 . As the t -step distributions of a stochastically monotone chain preserve dominance (see, e.g., Daley 1968) , F (t) ( · | w) and F ′ (t) ( · | w) are dominated by F (t) ( · | v 0 ) and F ′ (t) ( · | v 0 ) , respectively, for all t and all v 0 . Because the period-t gains from trade, ( v t − c t ) + , increase in v t , this implies that the infima are achieved at v 0 = w . Furthermore, it suffices to show that for all t , F ′ (t) ( · | w) dominates F (t) ( · | w) . To this end, note that by condition (iii) of Definition 7,
where Φ is the common invariant distribution. Since Φ dominates μ w , and the chains are stochastically monotone, Φ dominates F (t) ( · | w) and F ′ (t) ( · | w) . 30 Thus, we may dispense with the absolute value operator to get σ, 30 To see this, note that the t -step distribution starting from the invariant distribution Φ is Φ itself.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
The argument in the text gives the form of the allocation rule x * * and the existence of a PIC mechanism μ * * = ( x * * , p * * ) that solves the second-best problem (4). By balancing the transfers as in Athey and Segal (2013, proposition 2), we may take μ * * to be BB. Since μ * * satisfies (3), IR 0 follows by reversing the steps in (A5) once we note that the inequality on the last line holds as equality due to BB. This establishes the first claim.
In the interest of space, we only sketch the proof of the second claim. Note that since x * * is ex post monotone in the sense of Corollary 1 of PST, there exist transfers p such that μ = ( x * * , p) is EPIC (see PST, Remark 5). In periods t > 0 , given (not necessarily truthful) first-period reports v 0 and c 0 , the transfers p t can be simply taken to be the static Groves' scheme from the proof of Proposition 1, adjusted to account for the wedge in (5). Hence, we have IR for periods t > 0 . Suppose then that we add constant participation fees π B and π s in period 0 such that
T δ t ( P B, t + P s, t ) ] . We then have a mechanism μ ′ = ( x * * , p ′ ) that is EPIC, BB 0 , and IR for t > 0 . So it remains to check IR in period 0 . But since BB 0 holds as equality, this follows again by reversing the steps in (A5) because x * * satisfies (3).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
We start by establishing the first claim. To this end, fix Δ > 0 , and note that then r → 0 if and only if δ → 1 , so we may work with the latter. 
. y * * (Δ) is a continuous function of Δ by the theorem of the maximum, and lim Δ→0 y * * (Δ) ≤ y * exists. Furthermore, by Proposition 5, we have y * * (Δ) = y( x * * (Δ), Δ) = r( x * * (Δ), Δ) for all Δ > 0 , and, hence, lim Δ→0 r( x * * (Δ), Δ) = lim Δ→0 y * * (Δ) . Suppose toward contradiction that lim Δ→0 y * * (Δ) = y * . By inspection of (5) this requires that lim inf Δ→0 λ(Δ) = 0 , where λ(Δ) is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint (3).
For q ≥ 0 , define the allocation rule x q by setting x t q = 1 if and only if
Observe that x 0 = x * .
CLAIM A1: For all Δ > 0 , all q′ > q , r( x q ′ , Δ) ≤ r( x q , Δ) and r( x λ(Δ)
, Δ) ≤ r( x * * (Δ), Δ) .
Let Δ > 0 . The first inequality follows by noting that q′ > q implies x t q ≤ x t q ′ for all t , and the second by noting that x t λ(Δ) ≤ x t * * for all t . This establishes the claim.
Recalling that lim Δ→0 r( x * * (Δ), Δ) = lim Δ→0 y * * (Δ) , we now obtain the desired contradiction from the following claim: CLAIM A2: if lim inf Δ→0 λ(Δ) = 0 , then lim Δ→0 r( x * * (Δ), Δ) ≥ 2 y * .
To establish Claim A2, note that if lim inf Δ→0 λ(Δ) = 0 , then there exists a monotone sequence ( Δ n ) with Δ n → 0 such that λ n := λ( Δ n ) defines a monotone sequence ( λ n ) with λ n → 0 . By Claim A1, for all n and k , with n > k , we have
Thus, for all k , 
